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Interpreting Product Update as Reasoning about
Observations and Meta-Observations
Jan Broersen1
Abstract. In this brief note, I would like to suggest that it makes
sense to reinterpret product update, as introduced by Baltag, Moss
and Solecki, as a system to account for observations and meta-
observations, where a meta-observation is an observation of an ob-
servation. Under this interpretation we also take products of action
models with meta-action models. I deliberate on some possible con-
sequences of this extension to the interpretation of product update.
1 Introduction
Product update, as defined by Baltag, Moss and Solecki [1, 2], is
about updating multi-agent epistemic models by modeling the as-
similation of new information as a (restricted) modal product with
a multi-agent epistemic action model. This paper reports two obser-
vations2 concerning this framework. The first observation is that the
mechanism defined by taking products only fits with an interpreta-
tion of the actions in action models as observations. The second, re-
lated observation is that action models themselves might be viewed
as resulting from products of meta-action models representing meta-
observations. These (admittedly preliminary) ideas may give rise to
new action languages for talking about epistemic action models.
2 Product updates model observations
That the possible worlds resulting from a product update are a Carte-
sian product of the original worlds and the actions, is intuitively ex-
plained by the observation that in principle any of the epistemic ac-
tions in the action model can be performed from any state in the
static epistemic model. We get a restricted product by considering
the preconditions of the actions that prevent some actions to be per-
formed from certain states. For the uncertainty relation in the product
models the intersection of the uncertainty relations of the epistemic
model and the action model is taken.
Surprisingly, in the literature not much effort is spend on explain-
ing why it is that we have to take the intersection of the uncertainty
relations originating from the static epistemic model and the epis-
temic action model. Baltag and Moss [2], in their most recent account
of product update, say the following:
”We model the update of a state by an action as a partial update
operation, given by a restricted product of the two structures:
the uncertainties present in the given state and the given ac-
tion are multiplied, while the impossible combinations of states
and actions are eliminated (by testing the actions preconditions
on the state). The underlying intuition is that, since the agents
1 University of Utrecht, The Netherlands, email: broersen@cs.uu.nl
2 As far as I know, these observations have not been reported before.
uncertainties concerning the state and the ones concerning the
simple action are mutually independent, the two uncertainties
must be multiplied, except that we insist on applying an action
only to those states which satisfy its precondition.”
The quote explains that the intersection reflects multiplication of
independent uncertainties. But the quote does not explain why we
can assume this independency, nor does it explain what kind of ac-
tions actually ensure independency under the constraints imposed by
the preconditions.
I will approach the question concerning the reason for taking an
intersection from a slightly different angle. Prima facie, one might
consider taking an intersection surprising: if an agent performs the
same action from states he cannot distinguish, it will also not be able
to distinguish the result states. And if an agent does not distinguish
two actions from a state it does distinguish, again two or more indis-
tinguishable effect states will result. This would then rather suggest
that we should take the union instead of the intersection. So why is it
that the intersection is the right choice? The rough answer is: because
the actions of action models are ‘testing’ or ‘observation’ actions.
Such actions always aim at reducing uncertainty. Furthermore, what
these actions observe, must be true in the state where their precondi-
tion holds. So there is just exactly only one way in which observation
actions can result in uncertainty: from an uncertain state it must be
uncertain whether the observation has taken place. That explains the
intersection.
This also sheds light on the question above, concerning the rea-
son for the independence of the uncertainties involved. The indepen-
dence is explained by the reasonable assumption that observations
themselves do not interact with the conditions observed3 .
The term ‘observation’ should not be taken too literally here. Ac-
tually, from the level of abstraction we are looking at information
transfer, ‘observation’, ‘testing’, ‘learning’ and ‘announcing’ are all
alike. The difference between these concepts can only become more
clear if we can differentiate between sending and receiving agents,
their motivations for transferring information, and their strategies for
dealing with new information. The present setting, without notions
like ‘agency’ or ‘intention’ is simply too abstract for that.
3 Product update and meta-observation
Many standard examples are explicitly about observations. A well-
known one is the following [3, p.130]:
Example 1 In a situation with three colored cards and three agents
3 Note that this assumption conflicts with the uncertainty principle from quan-
tum physics.
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knowing their own card, agent 1 publicly observes a card of agent 3
(for instance, because 3 shows it to him).
The action model distinguishes three different observations: ‘1 ob-
serves 3 has red’ (1 : r@3), ‘1 observes 3 has white’ (1 : w@3) and
‘1 observes 3 has blue’ (1 : b@3). Agent 1 and 3 distinguish these
actions, agent 2 does not. Below are the pictures for the static initial
epistemic model, the action model, and the product model.
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Figure 1. Agent 1 publicly observes agent 3’s card
Now note that the description of example 1 also says that the ob-
servation itself is publicly observed. This is the first sign that some-
thing like ‘meta’-observations are relevant for the example. In the
following we will suggest that these meta-observations can be mod-
eled as action models themselves. We will refer to these models as
‘meta-action models’.
But now let us first extend the above example in order to make
more clear what we mean.
Example 2 Agent 3 has left the table, leaving his card on the table.
After coming back he suspects that 1 has taken a look at his card,
which, in fact is indeed what happened, and it happened publicly.
Agent 3 publicly announces his suspicion.
Figure 2 gives the right product model resulting from taking the
product with the appropriate action model for this example. The
model contains both the epistemic model of the initial situation and
the epistemic model resulting from the previous example, and agent
3 hesitates between these two models. But what is the action model
that produces this product model? Of course, it is not too difficult to
find the right action model. However, below we show we can decom-
pose this problem into two problems: finding the appropriate action
model and finding the appropriate meta-action model.
It is rather clear that in this example there are at least two levels
of observation. First there is the level where individual agents get
to know the results of the card showing action. This level is exactly
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Figure 2. Agent 3 suspects agent 1 has seen his card
the same as in the first example. Therefore, in figure 3, that gives
the action models for the observation and the meta-observation lev-
els, the observation level action model is the same as the one in fig-
ure 1 for the first example (with the exception of the non-connected
‘skip’ world, which we discuss later). Indeed, we might say that the
only difference between the two examples is on the level of meta-
observations: in the first the meta-observation is like a public an-
nouncement, and in the second the meta-observation action model
contains at least two meta-observation actions ‘3 observes that 1
takes a look at 3’s cards’ and ‘3 observes that 1 observes nothing’.
Agent 3 does not distinguish between these actions (because he does
not know whether the looking action actually took place). But agents
1 and 2 can distinguish between the two. Note that this meta-level
action model models the suspicion of agent 3 as the hesitation about
whether or not some observation has taken place on the observation
level. Maybe the hesitation and suspicion originates from agent 3
not being sure whether or not he saw that agent 1 was taking a look
at his card. Also note that the meta-level contains a third action: the
meta-action of agent 3 not meta-observing anything at all (‘skip’). To
make the view using meta-levels of observation work, for all agents
in the system we have to add such ‘non-observation/skip’ actions at
any level and meta-level. Note that in the meta-level action model
of figure 3, I only give the non-action for agent 3. Actually, to pre-
vent the picture from being flooded by states that are inessential for
explaining the idea I do not give any of the meta-level observation
actions of agents other than agent 3. This is why the figure says ‘etc.’
in the meta-level action model. In particular, as long as at the di-
rect meta-level there is no uncertainty about inaction, the non-actions
can be neglected. For instance, note that using the observation action
model of figure 3 in stead of the one in figure 1 to solve the first ex-
ample, does not make a difference. In particular, if we stick to the
original set-up, with only one level of action models, adding a non-
observation action to the action model does not make a difference as
long as there are no uncertainty relations linking it to other actions.
Finally, note that the product model resulting from the product of the
observation model and the meta-observation model, when multiplied
with the static epistemic model, yields the product model of figure 2,
as required.
Now, what are the preconditions for the actions in this meta-
observation action model? And how exactly do we define the prod-
uct of the meta-observation model and the observation model? The
preconditions for the meta-observations are straightforward. Just like
for the observation action models they just say that we can only ob-
serve what is actually true. For the action ‘observing nothing’ this
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Figure 3. The meta-observation as a meta-product
means we get ⊤ as a precondition, because it is an action that can
always be done. And as expected, since this is all about observa-
tion, for the product of an action model and a meta-action model we
also take the intersection of uncertainty relations. Finally, we get the
‘restricted’ product by checking the preconditions of the meta-action
model on the action model. In the specific example we deal with here,
we have three meta-observations. The meta-observations 3: (1−obs),
3: (1−skip) and 3−skip. The first meta-action has a precondition that
is true on all actions of the observation model where agent 1 observes
something. The second has a precondition that is true only on the ac-
tion in the action model where agent 1 observes nothing. Finally, the
precondition of 3−skip is true on all actions in the actions model. But
this part of the meta-product only yields an unconnected copy of the
action model.
In example 2 above, there is also a third meta-level of observa-
tion. Because of the involvement of this level, we say that agent 3
announces its suspicion. This ensures that the third meta-level is a
public announcement. Actually, for any example we come up with,
in principle infinitely many layers of observation play a role. Any
observation is itself an action for which we can ask whether it is ob-
served. So, for any observation potentially infinitely many actions
are performed at the same time: every observation possibly has a
meta-observation. In the examples above, this infinite hierarchy is
broken down by the first meta-level of observation that is a public
announcement. Actually, for any well-specified example, the highest
relevant meta-level of observation is always a public announcement.
If not, the example is under-specified, and leaves room for a non-
deterministic interpretation of the update. Actually, in most examples
in the literature, implicitly a closure assumption is applied: if nothing
is said about the meta-levels of observation, it is assumed that they
are public observations closed under meta-observations.
4 Future Research
The setting raises several questions. I briefly mention a few of them.
The first is that products and meta-products are not associative. This
is quite easy to see from the example above. The meta-products
should always be taken first. In particular, if we first take the prod-
uct of the static model and the observation level action model, it is
not clear how to take the product of the resulting product model with
the meta-level action model. Performing products in this order is not
even well-defined. But also it is clear that we throw away informa-
tion by first taking the product with the action model instead of the
product with the meta-action model. We cannot recover this infor-
mation. A possible problem is that associativity might be important
for certain examples. For instance, what if only at a later moment an
agent learns that his looking at the cards was observed or suspected
by another agent. Since we do note have associativity, this can only
be modeled by keeping track of all action and meta-action models
over time.
Another interesting question is how we can add agency to the pic-
ture. Actually, viewing the actions as observations of specific agents,
as we did in the above examples, is a first step in this direction. For
every observation action it is important to describe whose observa-
tion it is, since on the meta-observation level this information is used.
And for each observation action it is important to describe whose ac-
tion is observed. Above we used an ad-hoc notation to describe ac-
tions. An obvious route for investigation is to try to turn this notation
into an action language for observations and meta-observations.
One of the principles that suggest themselves is that agents always
observe their own observations. Note that the setting we sketched
actually does enable us to model situations where this is not the case.
However, methodologically it would be strange to allow this. We do
not want to get into the territory where agents make ‘sub-conscious’
observations.
The current set-up also enables us to speculate about a view where
all knowledge is viewed as observation4 , even at the ‘lowest’ level.
It is not too difficult to translate a standard static epistemic model
into an action model containing the same information. This is ac-
complished by also seeing the knowledge of each agent at the lowest
level as an observation. For instance, in the cards example, the static
model is equivalent to the action model where each agent observes
his own card.
I want to finish with a comment. It seems not right to claim that
the setting we sketched adds nothing new only because the meta-
products will simply return an action model of the form already avail-
able in the original setting of Baltag, Moss and Solecki. If that would
be a good argument against the present proposal, the original pro-
posal could be attacked with the same argument: product update adds
nothing new, because it can be seen as a system that only specifies a
complicated way to describe standard epistemic models.
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